Alliance4Europe

The Infinite Slop Machine

Documented a coordinated influence operation of at least 29 YouTube accounts publishing over 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos (March-December 2025), producing roughly two videos a day with AI narration and synthetic thumbnails to push pro-BRICS, anti-EU and anti-Western narratives.

Overloading the Moldovan Elections

A September 2025 visit by Western media figures, facilitated by the Russian Orthodox Church, produced content alleging religious persecution in Moldova that was then amplified by Russian FIMI operations to discourage support for the pro-EU government ahead of parliamentary elections.

Persistent Infrastructure and Cross-Border Influence Operations Targeting European Elections on X

Identified 550+ coordinated inauthentic accounts on X that amplified divisive content during the October 2025 Dutch elections (at least 225 traced to Nigeria, plus Ghana and Asia), and found the same infrastructure redeployed for the April 2026 Hungarian elections to boost pro-Orbán and pro-Russian content via the recommendation algorithm.

Information Laundering in Slovakia: An Analysis of Russian Influence Operation Networks

Mapped roughly 253 disinformation outlets and over 1,800 pro-Kremlin Facebook pages in Slovakia that translate and relaunder sanctioned Russian content through local-language intermediaries, and identifies Slovakia as the EU’s weakest enforcer of sanctions against these operations.

DISRUPT White Paper: A Whole-of-Society Approach to Defending Democracy Against Influence Operations

Introduces the DISRUPT toolkit: a three-phase (Prepare, Disrupt, Mitigate) whole-of-society framework for countering influence operations, built on 100+ disrupted cases and input from 50+ European organisations, arguing the gap in Europe’s defences is operational timing, not capability.

Assessment of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in the 2025 Czech Parliamentary Election

Found the 2025 Czech elections resilient: no evidence of coordinated, large-scale foreign interference capable of changing the outcome. Russian-linked actors focused on eroding trust via fraud narratives and content laundering (outlets like neČT24 and the Pravda network) across X, TikTok and Telegram rather than disrupting the vote itself.

Still marching on(line): How R-FBI Targets Moldova’s Elections

Detailed how the Russian operation Storm-1516 (linked to the sanctioned R-FBI) used fabricated news sites, AI-generated content and impersonated journalists to push 17 false narratives against President Sandu and the PAS party during Moldova’s 2025 elections, accumulating roughly 45 million views via authentic influencers and inauthentic accounts.

Interfering from Exile – Ilan Shor’s Demonstrations in Moldova

Exposed coordinated inauthentic behaviour promoting a Telegram bot tied to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor ahead of Moldova’s 2025 election: a network of ~117 amplifying accounts republished his content to evade EU sanctions, while the bot offered $3,000/month to protest and harvested passport, geolocation and facial data from participants.

Belarusian Propaganda Watch (April–August 2025)

A monitoring report analysing five Belarusian state-propaganda cases (Independence Day, Slavianski Bazaar, the Zapad-2025 exercises, worker arrivals from Pakistan, and the disappearance of Coordination Council spokesperson Anzhelika Melnikova) across historical, cultural, military, migration and repressive dimensions.

Moldova: Country Election Risk Assessment (CERA)

A pre-election risk assessment rating Moldova’s exposure to FIMI and hybrid threats as "high and rising" ahead of the September 2025 parliamentary elections, outlining three scenarios (limited impact, heightened polarisation, or coordinated hybrid attacks) and urging urgent inter-agency coordination.

Polish Election Country Report 2025

A 28-organisation assessment of FIMI during Poland’s 2025 presidential elections, finding persistent foreign operations (Doppelganger, Operation Overload) and domestic amplification of anti-Ukrainian, anti-EU and anti-establishment narratives, whose impact was constrained by public resilience and active civil-society responses.

Lega Artis’ Rise to Prominence: Inadequate Mechanisms for Curbing Kremlin Propaganda in the Polish Infosphere

Traced how Lega Artis, a 2018 legal blog, became an information-laundering vehicle republishing EU-sanctioned Russian media in Polish, expanding its social reach while circumventing DSA obligations and apparently using AI automation to distribute anti-EU disinformation at implausible volumes.

X-ploitation: How X Became a Crossroads for Child Abuse and Influence Operations

Documented "Operation X-ploitation," a network of 150+ automated accounts distributing child sexual abuse material on X via hashtag flooding and bot engagement, exploiting the same weaknesses (minimal account-creation barriers, weak moderation) used by Russian influence campaigns like Doppelganger. X’s age-verification and suspensions did not fix the underlying design flaws.