Saman Nazari

The Infinite Slop Machine

Documented a coordinated influence operation of at least 29 YouTube accounts publishing over 7,300 AI-generated geopolitical videos (March-December 2025), producing roughly two videos a day with AI narration and synthetic thumbnails to push pro-BRICS, anti-EU and anti-Western narratives.

DISRUPT White Paper: A Whole-of-Society Approach to Defending Democracy Against Influence Operations

Introduces the DISRUPT toolkit: a three-phase (Prepare, Disrupt, Mitigate) whole-of-society framework for countering influence operations, built on 100+ disrupted cases and input from 50+ European organisations, arguing the gap in Europe’s defences is operational timing, not capability.

Still marching on(line): How R-FBI Targets Moldova’s Elections

Detailed how the Russian operation Storm-1516 (linked to the sanctioned R-FBI) used fabricated news sites, AI-generated content and impersonated journalists to push 17 false narratives against President Sandu and the PAS party during Moldova’s 2025 elections, accumulating roughly 45 million views via authentic influencers and inauthentic accounts.

Interfering from Exile – Ilan Shor’s Demonstrations in Moldova

Exposed coordinated inauthentic behaviour promoting a Telegram bot tied to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor ahead of Moldova’s 2025 election: a network of ~117 amplifying accounts republished his content to evade EU sanctions, while the bot offered $3,000/month to protest and harvested passport, geolocation and facial data from participants.

Polish Election Country Report 2025

A 28-organisation assessment of FIMI during Poland’s 2025 presidential elections, finding persistent foreign operations (Doppelganger, Operation Overload) and domestic amplification of anti-Ukrainian, anti-EU and anti-establishment narratives, whose impact was constrained by public resilience and active civil-society responses.

X-ploitation: How X Became a Crossroads for Child Abuse and Influence Operations

Documented "Operation X-ploitation," a network of 150+ automated accounts distributing child sexual abuse material on X via hashtag flooding and bot engagement, exploiting the same weaknesses (minimal account-creation barriers, weak moderation) used by Russian influence campaigns like Doppelganger. X’s age-verification and suspensions did not fix the underlying design flaws.