Alliance4Europe· 10 April 2026· X/Twitter

Persistent Infrastructure and Cross-Border Influence Operations Targeting European Elections on X

By Maria Voltsichina and Robert van der Noordaa

Identified 550+ coordinated inauthentic accounts on X that amplified divisive content during the October 2025 Dutch elections (at least 225 traced to Nigeria, plus Ghana and Asia), and found the same infrastructure redeployed for the April 2026 Hungarian elections to boost pro-Orbán and pro-Russian content via the recommendation algorithm.

Misinformation & DisinformationElection IntegrityPlatform Compliance & GovernanceArt. 34/35 — Systemic risk

Executive summary

AI-generated

This summary was generated by AI from the original report to make it easier to scan and cite. It is not a substitute for the source. Read the original above.

Produced through the Hybrid Election Integrity Observatory (Trollrensics with Alliance4Europe and media partners), this report identifies a persistent, cross-border influence operation of more than 550 coordinated inauthentic accounts on X. First surfaced during the October 2025 Dutch parliamentary elections and traced predominantly to West African countries, the network reappeared during the April 2026 Hungarian elections using an identical modus operandi to game X’s recommendation algorithm in favour of pro-Orbán and pro-Russian content, exposing how the same disinformation infrastructure is reused across successive European votes.

Think this summary is wrong? Contact us.