Telegram research

Online Domestic Extremism in Canada Data Briefing (Dec 2025-Feb 2026)

Recurring data briefing tracking violent-extremist activity across major platforms in Canada; consistently finds Telegram the leading platform for such activity.

Noise without effect: anti-Pashinyan disinformation ahead of Armenian elections

Monitoring ahead of Armenian elections found foreign manipulation targeting PM Pashinyan; French TikTok users searching his name saw mostly hostile, partly AI-generated content from Kremlin-, diaspora- and Azerbaijan-linked accounts.

Harassment as Infrastructure: How Telegram's design enables TFGBV

Analysis of 2.8M messages across 16 groups/channels found organized networks of ~25,000 users across Italy and Spain spreading and monetizing non-consensual intimate images (NCII), including CSAM.

Sexualized images on X: what we are doing to stop them and what we expect from the EU

Documented networks of X accounts openly promoting non-consensual 'nudify' tools; a reported post was deemed non-violating, and X refused a DSA Art. 40.12 data request, blocking research (context to the EU's DSA fine on X).

Assessment of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in the 2025 Czech Parliamentary Election

Found the 2025 Czech elections resilient: no evidence of coordinated, large-scale foreign interference capable of changing the outcome. Russian-linked actors focused on eroding trust via fraud narratives and content laundering (outlets like neČT24 and the Pravda network) across X, TikTok and Telegram rather than disrupting the vote itself.

Still marching on(line): How R-FBI Targets Moldova’s Elections

Detailed how the Russian operation Storm-1516 (linked to the sanctioned R-FBI) used fabricated news sites, AI-generated content and impersonated journalists to push 17 false narratives against President Sandu and the PAS party during Moldova’s 2025 elections, accumulating roughly 45 million views via authentic influencers and inauthentic accounts.

Interfering from Exile – Ilan Shor’s Demonstrations in Moldova

Exposed coordinated inauthentic behaviour promoting a Telegram bot tied to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor ahead of Moldova’s 2025 election: a network of ~117 amplifying accounts republished his content to evade EU sanctions, while the bot offered $3,000/month to protest and harvested passport, geolocation and facial data from participants.

X-ploitation: How X Became a Crossroads for Child Abuse and Influence Operations

Documented "Operation X-ploitation," a network of 150+ automated accounts distributing child sexual abuse material on X via hashtag flooding and bot engagement, exploiting the same weaknesses (minimal account-creation barriers, weak moderation) used by Russian influence campaigns like Doppelganger. X’s age-verification and suspensions did not fix the underlying design flaws.

Operation Overload: an AI-fuelled escalation ('Overload 2')

The operation escalated using AI-generated content; Telegram is the central hub (673 channels) while ~11,000 X accounts amplify it. TikTok demoted accounts only after 3M+ views.

'Pravda' Network: Worldwide Expansion and LLM/Wikipedia Pollution

With DFRLab, showed the Russian 'Pravda' network expanded globally and polluted LLMs and Wikipedia; X's Community Notes failed to address its spread.

Generative AI and the German Far Right: Narratives, Tactics and Digital Strategies

Documents how German far-right actors use generative AI to produce and spread propaganda across social platforms, with new narrative and digital-strategy tactics.

Doppelganger media impersonation: leveraging domain name dispute resolution

Explores using domain-name dispute resolution as a countermeasure against the Doppelganger media-impersonation operation.

Operation Overload: a growing disinformation threat targeting the US election

With Reset Tech, confirmed the operation is Russia-based and had shifted focus to the US election, targeting Kamala Harris.

Social media's role in the UK riots (OSA amendments)

Policy paper arguing platforms (especially X and Telegram) fueled the riots via online hate/lies; proposes new regulatory powers.

Yet more evidence of Russia's boundless impunity to spread misinformation in the EU

Further documentation of the Doppelganger influence operation's continued reach across social platforms in the EU.

Operation Overload: pro-Russian actors flood newsrooms with fake content

Exposed the 'Matryoshka'/Operation Overload campaign flooding 800+ media/fact-checking organisations with content urging them to 'verify' fabricated anti-Ukraine material, diverting fact-checker resources.

Assessing cost-effectiveness: responses to the Doppelganger operation

Assesses responses to the Russian Doppelganger operation that clones media outlets and spreads links/ads across X, Facebook and Telegram.

Quantifying extremism: UK riot-related far-right Telegram networks

Data-driven analysis of ~45,000 messages during the 2024 UK riots mapping far-right Telegram networks.

In the Blind Spot: Right-wing Extremists on Alternative and Established Platforms

Analysis of how German-language right-wing extremists build and migrate infrastructure across both mainstream and alternative platforms, exposing moderation 'blind spots.'